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1 Introduction
This paper provides an O(p2) algorithm for calculating the nucleolus of p-person neighbour
games. Neighbour games, introduced in Klijn et al. (1999), form the intersection of assignment
games (cf. Shapley and Shubik (1972)) and component additive games (cf. Curiel et al. (1994)).
The latter one is the subclass of Γ-component additive games (cf. Potters and Reijnierse (1995))
in which the restricting graph Γ is a line graph. As a consequence, neighbour games have
many appealing properties, such as: the core is a non-empty set and coincides with the set
of competitive equilibria (Shapley and Shubik (1972)), the core coincides with the bargaining
set, and the nucleolus coincides with the kernel (Potters and Reijnierse (1995)). Moreover,
neighbour games satisfy the CoMa-property, i.e., the core is the convex hull of all marginal
vectors that are in the core (cf. Hamers et al. (1999)).
In literature, the computation of the nucleolus of assignment games and component additive
games has been discussed extensively. Solymosi and Raghavan (1994) presented an O(p4)
algorithm for calculating the nucleolus of p+ p-person assignment games. AnO(p4) algorithm
for calculating the nucleolus of p-person balanced connected games was provided by Solymosi
et al. (1998). The class of balanced connected games contains the class of component additive
games, and thus the class of neighbour games. This paper provides an O(p2) algorithm for cal-
culating the nucleolus of p-person neighbour games. Although the algorithm can be considered
as a common specialization of the two algorithms mentioned above, we present it on its own
right, since it exhibits special features that neither of the two more general algorithms does.
Besides, we give a different line of arguments to see the correctness of the algorithm from those
which were used to justify the mentioned more general algorithms.
In Section 2 we provide some preliminaries on cooperative games. Then, in Section 3
we recall the definition of neighbour games and present an O(p2) algorithm for finding the
nucleolus.
2 Preliminaries
A cooperative game with transferable utilities (or game, for short) is a pair (P, v) where
P = {1, ..., p} is a finite set of players and v : 2P → IR is a map that assigns to each coalition
S ∈ 2P a real number v(S), such that v(∅) = 0. Here, 2P is the collection of all subsets
(coalitions) of P .
Let (P, v) be a game with a non-empty imputation set I(v) := {x ∈ IRP : xi ≥
v(i) for all i ∈ P and x(P ) = v(P )}, where x(P ) :=
∑
i∈P xi. For an imputation x ∈ I(v)
and a coalition S ∈ 2P \{∅} we call f(S, x) := x(S) − v(S) the satisfaction of S. Next, let
F (x) := (f(S, x))∅6=S⊆N be the vector of satisfactions and let θ ◦ F (x) denote the vector of
satisfactions with its elements arranged in non-decreasing order. The nucleolus n(v) is then
defined by
n(v) := {x ∈ I(v) : θ ◦ F (x)lexθ ◦ F (y) for all y ∈ I(v)},
where lex denotes the lexicographical ordering on IR
|2P |. Given two vectors x, y ∈ IR|2
P | we
have xlexy if eitherx = y or there exists a k such that xi = yi for i = 1, . . . , k and xk+1 > yk+1.
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Schmeidler (1969) proved that if I(v) 6= ∅, then the nucleolus n(v) is a singleton. Moreover,
n(v) is a subset of the core, whenever the latter is not empty. The core of a game (P, v) consists
of all vectors that distribute the gains v(P ) obtained by P among the players in such a way that
no subset of players can be better off by seceding from the rest of the players and act on their
own behalf. Formally, the core of a game (P, v) is defined by
Core(v) := {x ∈ IRP : f(S, x) ≥ 0 for all S ⊂ P and f(P, x) = 0}.
A coalition S is called essential in the game (P, v) if S = S1 ∪ S2, S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, and
S1 6= ∅ 6= S2 imply that v(S) > v(S1) + v(S2). Otherwise, it is called inessential. Note that
one-player coalitions are always essential. Note also that the inequality related to an inessential
coalition in the definition of the core is redundant, i.e., it can be left out without enlarging
the solution set of the remaining inequalities. Therefore, for any collection G ⊆ 2P \{∅} that
contains all essential coalitions in the game (P, v) we have
Core(v) = {x ∈ IRP : f(S, x) ≥ 0 for all S ∈ G and f(P, x) = 0}. (1)
Huberman (1980) showed that inessential coalitions can also be omitted in the determination of
the nucleolus provided the core of the game is not empty. Since in that case the nucleolus lies
in the core, the underlying payoff set can be reduced to the core. More precisely,
n(v) = {x ∈ Core(v) : θ ◦G(x)lexθ ◦G(y) for all y ∈ Core(v)},
where G(x) := (f(S, x))S∈G is the vector of satisfactions of coalitions in G only.
Let (P, v) be a game with a non-empty core. Let G ⊆ 2P\{∅} contain all essential coalitions
in the game. We need to introduce some notions and notation to be able to describe a simplified
version of Kohlberg’s (1971) criterion for the nucleolus of such a game. We call a non-
empty collection B of coalitions in P balanced if there are positive numbers (λS)S∈B such that∑
S∈B λSeS = eP , where eS is the vector in IR
P with (eS)i = 1 if and only if i ∈ S and 0
otherwise. Given a number t ≥ 0 and an allocation x ∈ Core(v) we define
G(x, t) := {S ∈ G : f(S, x) ≤ t}
to be the collection of all coalitions in G whose satisfaction is not more than the given level t at
the given core allocation x. In light of Huberman’s (1980) simplification it is easy to see that in
this setting Kohlberg’s (1971) general criterion can be replaced by the following characterization
of the nucleolus.
Lemma 2.1 Let (P, v) be a game with a non-empty core. Let G ⊆ 2P \{∅} contain all essential
coalitions in (P, v). Then for x ∈ Core(v) it holds that {x} = n(v) if and only if G(x, t) is
balanced for all t ≥ 0.
3 Neighbour games and the nucleolus
In this section we provide a polynomially bounded algorithm of order p2 for finding the nucleolus
of neighbour games. We present the algorithm of order p2 for finding the nucleolus of a special
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subclass of neighbour games. After that, we show that we can calculate the nucleolus of
an arbitrary neighbour game by breaking up the game in appropriate subgames, applying the
algorithm to the subgames, and combining the nucleoli of the subgames. Moreover, we prove
that this procedure does not change the computational complexity. Before we present the
algorithm we recall the definition and some special features of neighbour games.
Let P = {1, . . . , p} be the player set and let σ : P → {1, ..., p} be an ordering of the players.
Obviously, P can be partitioned in the set M of players i in odd position (i.e., σ(i) is odd) and
the set N of players in even position (i.e., σ(i) is even). Players i and j are called neighbours
if |σ(i)− σ(j)| = 1. We shall use the (unconventional) notation (i, j) if σ(j) = σ(i) + 1, i.e.,
(., .) is used to indicate the order of (neighbouring) players as given by σ. For all pairs (i, j) let




aij : µ ∈ N (Q)} for all Q ⊆ P ,
whereN (Q) is the set of matchings of the players inQ in which each matching consists only of
pairs (i, j) that are neighbours. From now on the word matching means a matching of this type.
A matching µ ∈ N (Q) is called optimal for Q ⊆ P if
∑
(i,j)∈µ aij = v(Q). It is called minimal
if aij > 0 for all (i, j) ∈ µ. Note that v(i) = 0 for all i ∈ P and v(i, j) = aij for all pairs (i, j).
For the sake of convenience, we assume henceforth that the players in a neighbour game
(P, v) are ordered 1 ≺ 2 ≺ · · · ≺ p.
Example 3.1 Let P = {1, 2, 3, 4} be the player set and let σ describe the order 1 ≺ 2 ≺ 3 ≺ 4.
The pairs that are neighbours with respect to σ are (1,2), (2,3), and (3,4). Hence, all other
pairs have a worth equal to zero. Take, for instance, a12 = 10, a23 = 20, and a34 = 30. Then
the corresponding neighbour game (P, v) is depicted in Table 3.1. The matching that matches
player 1 with player 2 and player 3 with player 4 is optimal and minimal.
S {1, 2} {1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 4} {1, 3, 4} {2, 3} {2, 3, 4} {3, 4} {1, 2, 3, 4}
v(S) 10 20 10 30 20 30 30 40
Table 3.1: a neighbour game (P, v).

Obviously, from the definition of neighbour games it immediately follows that the class of
neighbour games is the intersection of the class of assignment games and component additive
games. It is also evident that neighbour games are monotonic game (i.e., v(S) ≤ v(T ) for all
S ⊆ T ⊆ P ) and supperadditive (i.e., v(S∪T ) ≥ v(S)+v(T ) for all S, T ⊆ P withS∩T = ∅).
Since neighbour games are special assignment games, the results of Shapley and Shubik
(1972) on the cores of assignment games apply to the cores of neighbour games. In particular, the
cores of neighbour games are not empty. Furthermore, they are determined by the inequalities
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induced by the one-player and the neighbouring pair coalitions. In other words, for any neighbour
game (P, v) the collection
G := {{i} : i ∈ P} ∪ {(i, i+ 1) : i ∈ P\{p}} (2)
contains all essential coalitions of any neighbour game on P . Henceforth, whenever we speak
of a coalition it is a singleton or a neighbouring pair of players.
For an optimal matching µ of P we denote, with a slight abuse of notation, by P+ the set
of players that are matched by µ. Define P− := P\P+, which will be called the set of isolated
players. The following lemma is a straightforward consequence of a result of Shapley and
Shubik (1972).
Lemma 3.2 Let (P, v) be a neighbour game. Let µ be an optimal matching of P . Let x ∈ IRP .
Then, x ∈ Core(v) if and only if the following four conditions are satisfied:
(i) xi + xi+1 = v(i, i+ 1) for all (i, i+ 1) ∈ µ;
(ii) xi + xi+1 ≥ v(i, i+ 1) for all (i, i+ 1) 6∈ µ;
(iii) xi = 0 for all players i ∈ P−;
(iv) xi ≥ 0 for all players i ∈ P+.
Next, we present an algorithm for finding the nucleolus for a special class of neighbour
games. Let us consider the subclass of neighbour games (P, v) with an even number of players
such that the pairs (1, 2), . . . , (p− 1, p) form the unique optimal matching for P . Consequently,
we must have v(1, 2), . . . , v(p− 1, p) > 0.
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Initial Step of the Algorithm
Input





Compute recursively for k = 1, . . . , p
2
x2k−1 := max {v(2k − 2, 2k − 1)− x2k−2, 0}
x2k := v(2k− 1, 2k) − x2k−1,
where v(0, 1) := 0 =: x0. The vector x ∈ IRP is the initial payoff vector.
Satisfaction
Calculate the initial satisfactions of the singletons fk := f({k}, x) = xk and the initial satisfac-




- settled if it is an odd-even pair of neighbours;3
- unsettled otherwise.
Call an unsettled coalition
- active if its satisfaction equals α;
- inactive otherwise.
Before we go on to the inductive step we prove that the initial payoff allocation x is the
even friendly core allocation and that the minimum satisfaction level of all unsettled coalitions
is α(= 0).
Lemma 3.3 Let x be the initial payoff allocation of the initial step. Then,
(i) For all i ∈ P , xi = v(1, . . . , i)− v(1, . . . , i− 1).
(ii) xi ≥ 0 for every odd player i and xi > 0 for every even player i.
Proof. First note that in case i is even, we have
v(1, . . . , i) = v(1, . . . , i− 2) + v(i− 1, i), (3)
and in case i is odd, we have
v(1, . . . , i) = max {v(1, . . . , i− 1), v(1, . . . , i− 2) + v(i− 1, i)}. (4)
(i) The proof is by induction on the players. Obviously, the Lemma holds for i = 1, 2. Suppose
that the Lemma holds for i = 1, . . . , k − 1, where we may assume that k ≥ 3. We distinguish
3Henceforth, we say odd-even pair for short. Likewise for even-odd pairs of neighbours.
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between two cases.
Suppose i is even. Then,
xi = v(i− 1, i)− xi−1
= v(i− 1, i)− [v(1, . . . , i− 1)− v(1, . . . , i− 2)]
= v(1, . . . , i)− v(1, . . . , i− 1),
where the first equality follows from the definition of xk, the second equality from the induction
hypothesis, and the third equality from (3).
Suppose i is odd. Then,
xi = max {v(i− 1, i)− xi−1, 0}
= max {v(i− 1, i)− [v(1, . . . , i− 1)− v(1, . . . , i− 2)], 0}
= max {v(1, . . . , i− 2) + v(i− 1, i)− v(1, . . . , i− 1), 0}
= max {v(1, . . . , i− 2) + v(i− 1, i), v(1, . . . , i− 1)} − v(1, . . . , i− 1)
= v(1, . . . , i)− v(1, . . . , i− 1),
where the first equality follows from the definition of xk, the second equality from the induction
hypothesis. The third and fourth equality are obtained by elementary rewriting. Finally, the last
equality follows from (4).
(ii) It immediately follows from the definition of xi that xi ≥ 0 for every odd player i. For an
even player i it holds that
xi = v(1, . . . , i)− v(1, . . . , i− 1)
= v(1, . . . , i− 2) + v(i− 1, i)− v(1, . . . , i− 1)
= v(1, . . . , i− 2) + v(i− 1, i)−max {v(1, . . . , i− 2), v(1, . . . , i− 3) + v(i− 2, i− 1)}
= v(i− 1, i)
> 0,
where the first equality follows from the definition of xk. The second and third equality from
(3) and (4), respectively. The fourth equality follows from the fact that µ is the unique optimal
matching. Finally, the inequality follows from the observation that v(1, 2), . . . , v(p− 1, p) > 0.
2
Lemma 3.4 The initial payoff allocation x is a core allocation. Moreover, it is the even friendly
core allocation, i.e., for all y ∈ Core(v) and for all even players i ∈ N it holds that xi ≥ yi.
Proof. One easily verifies that x satisfies the conditions of Lemma 3.2. This shows that
x ∈ Core(v).
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Suppose there is a core allocation y ∈ Core(v) and an even player i ∈ N such that xi < yi.
Since (i− 1, i) ∈ µ,
yi−1 = v(i, i− 1) − yi = xi−1 − (yi − xi) < xi−1, (5)
where the equalities follow from Lemma 3.2(i) for x, y ∈ Core(v) and the inequality from
xi < yi.
If xi−1 < (yi − xi), then yi−1 < 0 = v(i − 1), contradicting y ∈ Core(v). So, xi−1 ≥
(yi − xi) > 0. Then, by definition of xi−1, we have xi−1 = v(i− 1, i− 2)− xi−2. So,
xi−2 = v(i− 1, i− 2)− xi−1 < v(i− 1, i− 2)− yi−1 ≤ yi−2,
where the first inequality follows from (5) and the second inequality from y ∈ Core(v).
So, xi−2 < yi−2. We can repeat the same argument until we conclude that y1 < x1 = v(1),
contradicting y ∈ Core(v). 2
During the inductive step of the algorithm, which will be spelt out next, we settle singletons
and pairs that have not been settled yet. The satisfaction of a coalition that is settled will
no longer change during the remainder of the algorithm. The algorithm terminates when all
singletons are settled.
In every step of the algorithm we deal with a collection of settled and unsettled coalitions. We
refine the collection of singletons and pairs that have not been settled yet in two subcollections:
a collection of active coalitions and a collection of inactive coalitions. An unsettled singleton
or pair is called active if it has the minimum satisfaction among all coalitions that are unsettled.
Otherwise it is called inactive.
We define a component to be a maximal set of consecutive players in which each pair of
neighbours is settled or active. Note that since odd-even pairs are settled, a component always
starts with an odd player and ends with an even player.
The idea of the inductive step is the following. The initial vector is the even friendly
core allocation (Lemma 3.4). Hence, in order to obtain the nucleolus we should decrease the
satisfaction of the even players and increase the satisfaction of the odd players. For every
player i we determine a coefficient di that indicates in what direction and with which factor
the satisfaction of player i is going to change. After that, a positive number β is determined.
The number β depends on the unsettled even players and the inactive (even-odd) pairs. For
every player i, the satisfaction is now updated by adding diβ to his current satisfaction. The
minimum satisfaction of all unsettled players and pairs is increased with β. Finally, some
singletons and pairs might become settled. If this is the case, we verify whether there are still
unsettled singletons. If there are no unsettled singletons left, then we are done and the allocation
corresponding to the final satisfactions is the nucleolus. Otherwise, we repeat the inductive step.
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Inductive Step of the Algorithm: Repeat as long as there is an unsettled singleton:
Input
A qualification of the coalitions in G as settled, active, or inactive.
All the satisfactions fS, S ∈ G.
α := min{fS : S unsettled}
Coefficients





0 if {2k + 1} is settled;
1 if {2k + 1} is active and 2k + 1 = 1;
1 if {2k + 1} is active and {2k, 2k + 1} is inactive;
−d2k + 1 if 2k + 1 > 1 and {2k, 2k + 1} is active.
(6)
d2k+2 := −d2k+1. (7)
Compute for k = 1, . . . , p
2
− 1,
d2k,2k+1 := d2k + d2k+1. (8)
Increase of minimal satisfaction of unsettled coalitions
Compute
β := min {
fS − α
1− dS
: S is an inactive coalition and dS ≤ 0}. (9)
Now, update the satisfactions of all unsettled coalitions:
fS := fS + dSβ for all unsettled S. (10)
Update α := α+ β.
Qualification
If an unsettled even player i becomes active, i.e., fi = α, then settle all coalitions from the
component’s left most (odd) player upto and including player i.
If an inactive pair (i, i+ 1) becomes active and player i+ 1 was already settled, then settle all
coalitions from the component’s left most (odd) player upto and including coalition (i, i+ 1).
The next example shows several features of the algorithm.
Example 3.5 Let P = {1, . . . , 8} be a player set. In Figure 1, nodes depict the players and the
number above an edge denotes the value of the corresponding pair of players. The thick edges
correspond with the matched pairs in the optimal matching. The essential information of the
neighbour game (P, v) induced by Figure 1 is represented in the first two rows of Table 4.1.
We calculate the nucleolus of (P, v) in Table 4.1. The players and pairs are put in the first
row. The values of the pairs are given by the numbers in the second row. Then, we calculate the
initial payoff x vector using the initial step. Now we start the inductive step. For an explanation
of the concise notation in the table, let us consider rows 4,5, and 6.
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In row 4 we depict the satisfactions of all coalitions. If a particular satisfaction is in a box,
then the corresponding coalition has already been settled. If a satisfaction has an asterix, then
the satisfaction equals α. In row 5 we depict the coefficients, which are determined by (6),
(7), and (8). If a satisfaction and the coefficient below are in boldface, then the corresponding
coalition determines the number β, using (9). Finally, in row 6 we update the satisfactions using
(10). Finally, we settle players using the qualification.
We repeat the inductive step until all singletons are settled. The final payoff vector
(3, 3, 2, 5, 6, 3, 1, 1) is the nucleolus of the game (P, v). Note that coalition (2, 3) has not
been settled by the algorithm. 
1 2 3 4 5
6 1 7 9 9
6 87
2 2
Figure 1: a neighbour game (P, v).
1 12 2 23 3 34 4 45 5 56 6 67 7 78 8
v 6 1 7 9 9 2 2
x 0 6 0 7 2 7 0 2
α = 0, f 0* 0 6 5 0* 0 7 0* 2 0 7 5 0* 0 2
β = 1, d +1 0 -1 0 +1 0 -1 +1 +2 0 -2 -1 1 0 -1
α = 1, f 1* 0 5 5 1* 0 6 1* 4 0 5 4 1* 0 1*
settling - - -
α = 1, f 1* 0 5 5 1* 0 6 1* 4 0 5 4 1 0 1
β = 1, d +1 0 -1 0 +1 0 -1 +1 +2 0 -2 -2 0 0 0
α = 2, f 2* 0 4 5 2* 0 5 2* 6 0 3 2* 1 0 1
settling - - - - - - - -
α = 2, f 2* 0 4 5 2 0 5 2 6 0 3 2 1 0 1
β = 1, d +1 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
α = 3, f 3* 0 3* 4 2 0 5 2 6 0 3 2 1 0 1
settling - - -
α = 3, f 3 0 3 4 2 0 5 2 6 0 3 2 1 0 1
Table 4.1: calculating the nucleolus of (P, v).
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The next lemma shows, among others, that the inductive step is well-defined and that the
algorithm terminates in a finite number of steps ((e), (f), and (g)). The lemma will also be
used to prove Theorem 3.8, which states that the resulting payoff vector of the algorithm is the
nucleolus.
Lemma 3.6 In the inductive step of the algorithm:
(a) The coefficients of the odd players in (6) are well-defined, that is:
(i) player 1 is not inactive;
(ii) for k > 1, player 2k + 1 and pair (2k, 2k + 1) are not both inactive.
(b) The coefficients defined in (6), (7), and (8) satisfy:
(i) d2k+1 ≥ 1 for an unsettled odd player 2k + 1;
(ii) d2k+2 ≤ −1 for an unsettled even player 2k + 2;
(iii) d2k,2k+1 = 1 for an active pair (2k, 2k + 1);
(iv) d2k,2k+1 ≤ 0 for an inactive pair (2k, 2k + 1) in the first inductive step;
d2k,2k+1 ≤ 1 for an inactive pair (2k, 2k + 1) in all other inductive steps.
(c) 0 < β <∞.
(d) The updated minimum satisfaction level of all unsettled coalitions is α+ β.
(e) At least one unsettled even player gets settled or one inactive pair becomes active.
(f) Active pairs do not become inactive.
(g) Settled coalitions stay settled and the sum of the payoffs of its members does not change.
(h1) If an unsettled even-odd pair gets settled, then it has satisfaction α+ β.
(h2) Suppose that the left most (odd) player 2k + 1 of a maximal connected set of players that
get settled4 is unsettled. Then, player 2k + 1 has satisfaction α + β.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the number of steps. First we prove that (a)− (h2)
hold for step 1. After that, we assume that (a)− (h2) hold for step 1, . . . , t− 1 of the algorithm
and that there are still unsettled singletons. Then, we will prove that (a) − (h2) also hold for
step t of the algorithm.
(a) (i) Initially player 1 is not settled and f1 = x1 = 0 = α. Hence, player 1 is active.
(ii) Suppose that (2k, 2k + 1) is inactive, i.e., x2k + x2k+1 − v(2k, 2k + 1) > 0. So,
x2k+1 > v(2k, 2k + 1) − x2k. Then, by definition of the initial allocation, x2k+1 = 0. Hence,
x2k+1 = 0 = α. So, player 2k + 1 is active.
(b) (i) Follows from (6) and (7).
(ii) Since player 2k + 1 is not settled, we have by (i) that d2k+1 ≥ 1. Then, (7) implies
d2k+2 ≤ −1.
(iii) Since (2k, 2k + 1) is active, we have according to (6) that d2k+1 = −d2k + 1. By (8) the
result follows.
(iv) Since (2k, 2k + 1) is inactive, we have by (a)(ii) that 2k + 1 is active. Hence, d2k+1 = 1
by (7). By (b)(ii) we have d2k ≤ −1. So, the result follows by (8).
4That is, there is no strict superset that is connected and that gets settled as well.
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(c) The coalitions that are relevant to calculate β are the even-odd pairs (2k, 2k + 1) that
are inactive and the inactive even players, since the odd-even pairs are settled and for the inac-
tive player 2k + 1 it holds that d2k+1 ≥ 1 > 0 by (b)(i).
Let (2k, 2k+1) be an inactive pair. Then, since initiallyα = 0, we have d2k,2k+1 ≤ 0 by (b)(iv).




For an inactive even player 2k we have d2k ≤ −1 (by (b)(ii)) and f2k −α = f2k = x2k > 0
(by Lemma 3.3). So, f2k−α
1−d2k
∈ (0,∞).
Now note that there is at least one unsettled even player and (c) follows.
(d), (e) We write f ′S for the satisfaction of coalition S after the update.
From (c) it follows that there is an active coalition S that is either an inactive pair (2k, 2k+1)








= β = α + β.
So, it is sufficient to prove that for all unsettled coalitions S we have f ′S ≥ α+ β.
Let 2k+1 be an (unsettled) odd player. By (b)(i), d2k+1 ≥ 1. So, f ′2k+1 = f2k+1+d2k+1β ≥
f2k+1 + β ≥ α+ β, where the last inequality follows since player 2k + 1 is unsettled.




So, f ′2k = f2k + d2kβ ≥ α + β.
Suppose (2k, 2k + 1) is an active pair. By (b)(iii), d2k,2k+1 = 1. So, f ′2k,2k+1 = f2k,2k+1 +
d2k,2k+1β = f2k,2k+1 + β = α+ β, where the last equality follows since (2k, 2k + 1) is active.
Suppose (2k, 2k+ 1) is an inactive pair. By (b)(iv), d2k,2k+1 ≤ 0. Then from β ≤
f2k,2k+1−α
1−d2k,2k+1
it follows that f ′2k,2k+1 = f2k,2k+1 + d2k,2k+1β ≥ α+ β.
(f) follows from (b)(iii) and (d).
(g) By the settling procedure in the initial step, the only settled coalitions are the odd-even
pairs. By definition of the settling procedure they stay settled. It follows from (7) that the sum
of the payoffs of the players in an odd-even pair does not change.
(h1) Suppose an (unsettled) even-odd pair (2k, 2k + 1) gets settled. Then, by definition of
the settling procedure, (2k, 2k + 1) is active. From (b)(iii) it then follows that the satisfaction
of (2k, 2k + 1) is equal to α+ β.
(h2) Let 2k + 1 be the left most (odd) player of a maximal connected set of players that
get settled. Then, by the initial settling procedure, player 2k+ 1 is unsettled. If 2k+ 1 = 1, then
the satisfaction of player 2k + 1 is equal to α + β by (6). If 2k + 1 6= 1, then, by definition of
the settling procedure, (2k, 2k + 1) is not active. So, by (a)(ii), player 2k + 1 is active. Hence,
by (d), the satisfaction of player 2k + 1 is equal to α + β.
Now assume that (a) − (h) hold for steps 1, . . . , t − 1 of the algorithm and that there are
still unsettled singletons. We prove that (a)− (h) also hold for step t of the algorithm.
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(a) As for (i), suppose that player 1 is not settled in step t. Then it follows from the In-
duction Hypothesis (IH, for short) ((g) and (a)(i)) that player 1 was active in step t− 1. Then,
by (6), in step t − 1 we had d1 = 1. So, player 1 got the minimal increase of satisfactions of
unsettled coalitions in step t− 1. So, by (d) for step t− 1, player 1 is also active in step t.
As for (ii), suppose that in step t player 2k + 1 is unsettled and (2k, 2k + 1) is inactive.
Then it follows from IH ((f) and (g)) that (2k, 2k + 1) was inactive in step t− 1. From IH ((g)
and (a)(ii)) it follows that player 2k + 1 was active in step t − 1. So, player 2k + 1 got the
minimal increase of satisfactions of unsettled coalitions in step t− 1. So, by (d) for step t− 1,
player 2k + 1 is also active in step t.
(b) (i) follows from (6) and (7). (ii) follows from (6), (7), and the fact that if player 2k is
not settled, then player 2k−1 is also not settled. (iii) follows from (6) and (8). As for (iv), note
that d2k+1 = 1 by (6). Furthermore, d2k ≤ 0 by (6) and (7). So, d2k,2k+1 = d2k + d2k+1 ≤ 0 + 1
by (8).
(c) Suppose (i, i + 1) is an inactive pair. Then, (i, i + 1) = (2k, 2k + 1) for some k (by
IH (g) for steps 1, . . . , t − 1). Then, d2k,2k+1 ≤ 1 by (b)(iv). Since (2k, 2k + 1) is inactive,
f2k,2k+1 − α > 0. Since we compute
f2k,2k+1−α
1−d2k,2k+1
only if d2k,2k+1 < 1, this ratio is positive and
finite.
For an unsettled even player 2k we have d2k ≤ −1 (by (b)(ii)) and f2k − α > 0 (by IH (d)
for steps 1, . . . , t− 1 and the definition of the settling procedure). So, f2k−α
1−d2k
∈ (0,∞).
By assumption there are still unsettled singletons. Then, it follows from the definition of
the settling procedure and IH (g) for steps 1, . . . , t− 1 that there is at least one unsettled even
player. This proves (c).
(d), (e) The proof is almost a copy of the proof of (d), (e) for step 1, except for the part in
which we prove that for every inactive pair (2k, 2k + 1) it holds that f ′2k,2k+1 ≥ α + β.
Take an inactive pair (2k, 2k + 1). By (b)(iv), d2k,2k+1 ≤ 1. If d2k,2k+1 = 1, then
f ′2k,2k+1 = f2k,2k+1 + d2k,2k+1β = f2k,2k+1 +β > α+β, where the inequality follows from the
fact that (2k, 2k + 1) is inactive and IH (d) for step t− 1.
If d2k,2k+1 < 1, then from β ≤
f2k,2k+1−α
1−d2k,2k+1
it follows that f ′2k,2k+1 = f2k,2k+1 + d2k,2k+1β ≥
α+ β.
(f) follows from (b)(iii) and (d).
(g) By definition of the settling procedure the settled coalitions stay settled.
Suppose an odd player 2k + 1 is settled. By (6), d2k+1 = 0. So, the payoff of player 2k + 1
does not change.
Suppose an even player 2k is settled. By definition of the settling procedure, player 2k − 1
is also settled. Then, it follows from (6) and (7) that d2k = 0. So, the payoff of player 2k does
not change.
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Suppose an even-odd pair (2k, 2k + 1) is settled. By definition of the settling procedure,
players 2k are 2k+ 1 are also settled. Then, it follows from the above that the payoffs of players
2k and 2k + 1 do not change. So, the sum of the payoffs of players 2k and 2k + 1 does not
change either.
Finally, let (2k − 1, 2k) be a (settled) odd-even pair. By (6) and (7), the sum of the payoffs
of players 2k − 1 and 2k does not change.
(h1) Suppose that an unsettled even-odd pair (2k, 2k + 1) gets settled. By definition of the
settling procedure, (2k, 2k + 1) is active. From (b)(iii) it then follows that the satisfaction of
(2k, 2k + 1) is equal to α+ β.
(h2) Let 2k + 1 be the left most (odd) player of a maximal connected set of players that
get settled. Suppose that player 2k+ 1 is unsettled. If 2k+ 1 = 1, then, by (a)(i), player 2k+ 1
is active. By (6) and (d) it then follows that the satisfaction of player 2k + 1 is equal to α + β.
If 2k + 1 6= 1, then, by definition of the settling procedure, (2k, 2k + 1) is not active. So, by
(a)(ii), player 2k + 1 is either settled or active. Since we have assumed that player 2k + 1 is
unsettled, it follows that player 2k+ 1 is active. Hence, by (d), the satisfaction of player 2k + 1
is equal to α + β. 2
The following lemma will be used to show that the outcome of the algorithm is the nucleolus.
Lemma 3.7 Let (P, v) be a neighbour game. LetB ⊆ G be a non-empty collection of coalitions.
Then,B is balanced if and only if for every T ∈ B there is a partition C ofP such thatT ∈ C ⊆ B.
Proof. First we prove the ‘if’-part. For each T ∈ B, let CT be a partition of P such that
T ∈ CT ⊆ B. Let us count how many times a coalition U ∈ B appears in the partitions CT ,
T ∈ B, and let u denote this number. Clearly, 1 ≤ u ≤ |B|. Now it is straightforward to check
that the weights λU := u|B| balance the collection B.
To prove the ‘only if’-part, let B be balanced. Take any T ∈ B. Let i denote the right most
player in T , i.e., T = {i} or (i− 1, i). If i < p, then there must be a coalition U ∈ B with left
most player i+ 1, since the weight of coalition (i, i+ 1) - if it is in B at all - is strictly less than
1, so player i+ 1 must also be covered by coalitions in B disjoint from T . Let j denote the right
most player in U , i.e., j = i+ 1 or i+ 2. If j < p, then we repeat the argument. Eventually we
select disjoint coalitions from B that cover all the players from i+ 1 upto and including p. A
similar argument to the left gives that there are disjoint coalitions in B that cover all the players
on the left of T . We conclude that the condition in the lemma is indeed satisfied. 2
Theorem 3.8 The final allocation of the algorithm is the nucleolus.
Proof. Let (P, v) be a neighbour game for which p is even and µ = {(2k−1, 2k) : k = 1, . . . , p
2
}
is the unique optimal matching. Let z be the final allocation of the algorithm.
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We prove that n(v) = {z} by using Lemma 2.1, i.e., we check the balancedness of G(z, t)
for all t ≥ 0. Actually, we verify the balancedness of G(z, f(S, z)) for all S ∈ G. Take S ∈ G.
We have to show that G(z, f(S, z)) is balanced. By Lemma 3.7 it is sufficient to show that for
every T ∈ G(z, f(S, z)) there is a partition C of P such that T ∈ C ⊆ G(z, f(S, z)). So, take
T ∈ G(z, f(S, z)). We distinguish between the case in which T gets settled and the case in
which it does not get settled in the algorithm.
CASE 1: coalition T gets settled in the algorithm.
Suppose T gets settled in the initial step. Then T is an odd-even pair. Since also all other
odd-even pair get settled in the initial step, the collection of these pairs is a partition with the
desired property for T .
Now we suppose that T gets settled during the inductive step of the algorithm. We distin-
guish between the two events in the inductive step that cause T to get settled.
SUBCASE 1.A: an unsettled even player j becomes active.
Let f ′j = α + β > 0 be his satisfaction. We settle all coalitions from the component’s left
most (odd) player i upto and including player j. Note that T is one of these coalitions and
f ′T ≥ α+ β (Lemma 3.6 (d)).
By Lemma 3.6 (h1), (h2), and (g), the coalitions {i}, {i+ 1, i+ 2}, {i+ 3, i+ 4}, . . . , {j−
2, j − 1}, {j} have satisfactions ≤ α + β. This collection together with some odd-even pairs
forms a partition, and hence a partition with the desired property for T if T ∈ {{i}, {i+ 1, i+
2}, {i+ 3, i+ 4}, . . . , {j − 2, j − 1}, {j}}.
If T 6∈ {{i}, {i+ 1, i+ 2}, {i+ 3, i+ 4}, . . . , {j− 2, j− 1}, {j}}, then T is some singleton
{k} ⊆ {i, . . . , j}, since the satisfaction of odd-even pairs equals 0 and f ′S ≥ α+ β > 0. Now
T = {k} forms together with some odd-even pairs and {k+ 1, k+ 2}, {k+ 3, k+ 4}, . . . , {j−
2, j − 1}, {j} a partition with the desired property for T if k is odd. If k is even, then T = {k}
together with some odd-even pairs and {i}, {i+ 1, i+ 2}, {i+ 3, i+ 4}, . . . , {k − 2, k − 1} is
a partition with the desired property for T .
SUBCASE 1.B: an inactive pair (j, j + 1) becomes active and coalition {j + 1} is already
settled.
Let f ′(j,j+1) = α + β be the satisfaction of the pair (j, j + 1). We settle all coalitions from the
component’s left most (odd) player i upto and including coalition {j, j + 1}. Note that T is one
of these coalitions and f ′T ≥ α + β (Lemma 3.6 (d)).
By Lemma 3.6 (h1), (h2), and (g), the coalitions {i}, {i+1, i+2}, {i+3, i+4}, . . . , {j, j+1}
have satisfactions ≤ α+ β. Since {j + 1} is settled, there exists some even player l for which
the coalitions {j + 1}, {j + 2, j + 3}, {j + 4, j + 5}, . . . , {l− 2, l− 1}, {l} are settled and have
all the same (fixed) satisfaction zj+1 < f ′(j,j+1). The collection that consists of the coalitions
{i}, {i+1, i+2}, {i+3, i+4}, . . . , {j, j+1}, {j+2, j+3}, {j+4, j+5}, . . . , {l−2, l−1}, {l}
together with some odd-even pairs forms a partition and hence a partition with the desired
property for T if T ∈ {{i}, {i+ 1, i+ 2}, {i+ 3, i+ 4}, . . . , {j, j + 1}}.
If T 6∈ {{i}, {i+ 1, i+ 2}, {i+ 3, i+ 4}, . . . , {j, j + 1}}, then T is some singleton {k} ⊆
{i, . . . , j}, since the satisfaction of odd-even pairs equals 0 and f ′T ≥ α+β > 0. Now T = {k}
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forms together with some odd-even pairs and {k+1, k+2}, {k+3, k+4}, . . . , {l−2, l−1}, {l}
a property with the desired property for T if k is odd. If k is even, then T = {k} together with
some odd-even pairs and {i}, {i+ 1, i+ 2}, {i+ 3, i+ 4}, . . . , {k− 2, k− 1} is a partition with
the desired property for T .
CASE 2: coalition T does not get settled in the algorithm.
Since all singletons and all odd-even pairs get settled, T is an even-odd pair. So, T = (2k, 2k+1)
for some k. Note that (2k, 2k + 1) is inactive (otherwise we would have settled (2k, 2k + 1)
in the last step of the algorithm). Since the coalitions {2k} and {2k + 1} are already settled, it
follows from the definition of the settling procedure and Lemma 3.6 (h2) that the satisfaction
of (2k, 2k + 1) is greater than the satisfaction of both {2k} and {2k + 1}.
Then, by combining the partitions for {2k} and {2k + 1} appropriately, it readily follows
that there is also a partition with the desired property for (2k, 2k + 1). 2
Proposition 3.9 Let (P, v) be a neighbour game for which p is even and µ = {(2k − 1, 2k) :
k = 1, . . . , p
2
} is the unique optimal matching. Then, the algorithm determines the nucleolus of
(P, v) in O(p2) time.
Proof. Initially, there are at most p− 1 inactive singletons and pairs (p
2
even players and p
2
− 1
even-odd pairs). By Lemma 3.6 (e) and (f), in every inductive step at least one unsettled even
player gets settled or one inactive pair becomes active (and does not become inactive anymore).
So, the algorithm terminates after at most p− 1 inductive steps.
Since both the initial and the inductive step take O(p) time, the algorithm determines the
nucleolus in O(p2) time. 2
Now we show that we can calculate the nucleolus of an arbitrary neighbour game by breaking
up the game in appropriate subgames, applying the algorithm to the subgames, and constructing
the nucleolus out of the nucleoli of the subgames. We prove that this procedure does not change
the computational complexity.
For this, let (P, v) be a neighbour game. Let us first consider the relation between the
nucleolus and the kernel (Davis and Maschler (1965)) of (P, v). Since the class of neighbour
games is a subclass of the class of component additive games it immediately follows from Potters
and Reijnierse (1995) that the kernel k(v) coincides with the nucleolus n(v). Using Potters and
Reijnierse (1995), it is not difficult to prove that
n(v) = {x ∈ Core(v) : sii+1(x) = si+1i(x) for all i = 1, . . . , p− 1}, (11)
where sii+1(x) = min {x(S)− v(S) : i ∈ S ⊆ P\{i+ 1}, S connected} (and si+1i(x) defined
similarly). Note that sii+1(x), si+1i(x) ≥ 0 by the fact that x ∈ Core(v). Let µ be an optimal
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matching of P . To simplify expression (11), we make the following two remarks for a core
allocation x ∈ Core(v). First, from Lemma 3.2(iii) it follows that sii+1(x) = 0 for i ∈ P−,
i 6= p. For such i, we have that i + 1 ∈ P− or (i + 1, i + 2) ∈ µ. One can verify that in both
cases si+1i(x) = 0. Second, if {i, i+ 1} ⊆ P+, but (i, i+ 1) 6∈ µ, then sii+1(x) = 0 = si+1i(x)
by using Lemma 3.2(i) and taking S = {i − 1, i} and S = {i + 1, i + 2}, respectively. From
these two remarks it follows that (11) can be reduced further to
n(v) = {x ∈ Core(v) : sii+1(x) = si+1i(x) for all (i, i+ 1) ∈ µ}. (12)
Note, however, that (12) does not directly help us a great deal in calculating the nucleolus.
This is because the equations sii+1(x) = si+1i(x) contain a lot of cumbersome minimization
operations, already for a small number of players.
Nevertheless, expression (12) together with the next lemma shows that in order to calculate
the nucleolus of a neighbour game, it suffices to calculate the nucleolus for the subgames with
possible isolated players on the extremes and no isolated players in the middle.
Lemma 3.10 Let (P, v) be a neighbour game. Letx ∈ Core(v). Let i ∈ P− and k ∈ {i, . . . , p}.
Then, skk+1(x) = min {x(j, . . . , k)− v(j, . . . , k) : i ≤ j ≤ k}.
Proof. Take some connected set S ⊇ {i, . . . , k} =: S ′ with k + 1 6∈ S. Let µS be an optimal
matching for S. Define a matching µS′ for S ′ by (j, j + 1) ∈ µS′ iff (j, j + 1) ∈ µS and j ≥ i.
Then,





























The first inequality follows from the fact that µS is an optimal matching for S and µS′ is a
matching for S ′. The first equality follows from the definition of µS′ . The second inequality
from the fact that {(j, j+ 1) : (j, j+ 1) ∈ µS , j < i} defines a (possibly non-optimal) matching
for S\S ′. The third inequality follows from the fact that x ∈ Core(v). 2
Corollary 3.11 Let (P, v) be a neighbour game. Suppose there is a player i ∈ P− with
1 < i < p. Let S1 := {1, . . . , i} and S2 := {i, . . . , p}. Then,
n(v) = (n1(v|S1), . . . , ni−1(v|S1), 0, ni+1(v|S2), . . . , np(v|S2)).
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Now let us consider neighbour games with possible isolated players on the extremes and no
isolated players in the middle. In the next lemmas we show that we can make a further reduction
by proving that it suffices to calculate the nucleolus of a neighbour game that slightly differs
from the original game and in which we leave out the isolated players of the original game. In
Lemma 3.12 we consider the case in which only the first player is isolated. In Lemma 3.13 we
consider the case in which only the last player is isolated. And finally, in Lemmas 3.14 and 3.15
we consider the case in which both the first and the last player are isolated. Only the proof of
Lemma 3.12 is given; the proofs of Lemmas 3.13, 3.14, and 3.15 run similarly.
Lemma 3.12 Let (P, v) be a neighbour game with |P | ≥ 3. Assume that the matching µ =
{(2, 3), . . . , (p− 1, p)} is optimal. Define a neighbour game (P\{1}, v̄), by setting v̄(2, 3) :=
v(2, 3) − v(1, 2) and v̄(i, i + 1) := v(i, i+ 1) for 3 ≤ i ≤ p − 1. Then, n1(v) = 0, n2(v) =
n2(v̄) + v(1, 2), and ni(v) = ni(v̄) for i ∈ P , i ≥ 3.
Proof. Note that v̄(2, 3) ≥ 0, since v(2, 3) ≥ v(1, 2) by optimality of µ. So, (P\{1}, v̄) is
indeed a neighbour game.
Let x = n(v̄) and define y ∈ IRP by y1 := 0, y2 := n2(v̄) + v(1, 2), and yi := ni(v̄)
for i ∈ P , i ≥ 3. By Lemma 3.2, y ∈ Core(v). One easily verifies that f({1}, y) = 0,
f({1, 2}, y) = f({2}, x), and f({2}, y) ≥ f({2}, x) = f({1, 2}, y). Further, it is clear that
f(S, y) = f(S, x) for any other singleton and pair of neighbours. Using Lemma 2.1 and Lemma
3.7 one verifies that y = n(v). 2
Lemma 3.13 Let (P, v) be a neighbour game with |P | ≥ 3. Assume that the matching
{(1, 2), . . . , (p − 2, p − 1)} is optimal. Define a neighbour game (P\{p}, v̄), by setting
v̄(p− 2, p− 1) := v(p− 2, p− 1)− v(p− 1, p) and v̄(i− 1, i) := v(i− 1, i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ p− 2.
Then, np(v) = 0, np−1(v) = np−1(v̄) + v(p− 1, p), and ni(v) = ni(v̄) for i ∈ P , i ≤ p− 2.
Lemma 3.14 Let (P, v) be a neighbour game with |P | = 4. Assume that the matching {(2, 3)} is
optimal. Define a neighbour game (P\{1, 4}, v̄), by setting v̄(2, 3) := v(2, 3)−v(1, 2)−v(3, 4).
Then, n1(v) = n4(v) = 0, n2(v) = n2(v̄) + v(1, 2), and n3(v) = n3(v̄) + v(3, 4).
Lemma 3.15 Let (P, v) be a neighbour game with |P | > 4. Assume that the matching
{(2, 3), . . . , (p − 2, p − 1)} is optimal. Define a neighbour game (P\{1, p}, v̄), by set-
ting v̄(2, 3) := v(2, 3) − v(1, 2), v̄(p − 2, p − 1) := v(p − 2, p − 1) − v(p − 1, p), and
v̄(i, i+ 1) := v(i, i+ 1) for 3 ≤ i ≤ p− 3. Then, n1(v) = np(v) = 0, n2(v) = n2(v̄) + v(1, 2),
np−1(v) = np−1(v̄) + v(p− 1, p), and ni(v) = ni(v̄) for 3 ≤ i ≤ p− 2.




Let (P, v) be a neighbour game. Let µ be an optimal and minimal matching for P . Using
Corollary 3.11 we break the game (P, v) up in (overlapping) subgames that are still neighbour
games, but have no longer isolated players in the middle. Then, we use Lemmas 3.12, 3.13,
3.14, and 3.15 to remove the isolated players from the subgames that are not zero 2-person
games. By doing this the induced matchings of µ for the obtained games may not all be minimal
any longer. (See Example 3.16 for an illustration of this.) By taking an optimal and minimal
matching for the games in which this occurs, we repeat the above procedure to remove the new
isolated players. Eventually we have only games that satisfy either the assumptions made for the
algorithm or are zero 2-person games. Once we have calculated the nucleolus of every subgame
we use Lemmas 3.12, 3.13, 3.14, and 3.15 to construct the nucleolus of the game (P, v).
Now we present an example in which the above procedure is used to calculate the nucleolus
of an 11-person neighbour game.
Example 3.16 Consider the neighbour game (P, v), where P = {1, . . . , 11} and v is given by
figure 2. The nodes depict the players and the number above an edge denotes the value of the
corresponding pair of players. The numbers below the nodes are the payoffs of the nucleolus
of the corresponding game. The thick edges correspond with the matched pairs in the optimal
matchings. We calculate the nucleolus of (P, v).
Using Corollary 3.11 we break the game (P, v) up in the subgames ({1, . . . , 6}, v1) and
({6, . . . , 11}, v5). Then, we use Lemma 3.15 to reduce ({1, . . . , 6}, v1) to ({2, 3, 4, 5}, v2). If
we take the (unique) optimal and minimal matching {(4, 5)} for the game ({2, 3, 4, 5}, v2) and
apply Corollary 3.11 to ({2, 3, 4, 5}, v2) we get the game ({3, 4, 5}, v3) and the zero 2-person
game ({2, 3}, 0). Applying Lemma 3.12 to the game ({3, 4, 5}, v3) yields the game ({4, 5}, v4).
For the subgame ({6, . . . , 11}, v5) we use Lemma 3.15 to get the game ({7, 8, 9, 10}, v6).
The nucleolus of the game ({4, 5}, v4) is (1, 1). So, by Lemma 3.12 the nucleolus of
({3, 4, 5}, v3) is (0, 4, 1). Hence, the nucleolus of ({2, 3, 4, 5}, v2) is (0, 0, 4, 1). Then, by Lem-
ma 3.15, the nucleolus of ({1, . . . , 6}, v1) is (0, 2, 0, 4, 3, 0). By a similar reasoning and the use
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Figure 2: subsequent break-ups of the neighbour game (P, v).
In Proposition 3.17 we show that the extended algorithm has the same computational com-
plexity as the original algorithm.
Proposition 3.17 The extended algorithm determines for a neighbour game (P, v) withpplayers
the nucleolus in O(p2) time.
Proof. It takesO(p2) time to find the subgames to which we apply the algorithm. Let p1, . . . , pk
be the cardinalities of the player sets of these subgames. Note, p1 + · · · + pk ≤ p. By
Proposition 3.17 it takes O(pl2) time to calculate the nucleolus of the l-th subgame. Since
(p1)2 + · · ·+ (pk)2 ≤ p2, it takesO(p2) time to calculate the nucleoli of all subgames. Finally,
note that the construction of the nucleolus of (P, v) out of the nucleoli of the subgames takes
O(p2) time. We conclude that we determine the nucleolus of (P, v) in O(p2) time. 2
We conclude this section by providing explicit formulas for the nucleolus of neighbour





Suppose |P | = 3. Let a = v(1, 2) and b = v(2, 3). We may assume, without loss of generality,
that a ≥ b. Using Lemma 2.1 one easily verifies that if a
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, 0), and if
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+ b, 0). The next Proposition gives an explicit formula for the
nucleolus if |P | = 4.
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Proposition 3.18 Let (P, v) be a 4-person neighbour game, where P = {1, 2, 3, 4} and the
characteristic function v is induced by a12 = a ≥ 0, a23 = b ≥ 0, and a34 = c ≥ 0. Assume,
without loss of generality, that a ≥ c. Then,
(i) if b ∈ [0, c
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(iii) if b ∈ [ 2a−c
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Proof. Follows straightforwardly from Lemma 2.1. 2
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